Publications
Nonhuman Value
- Author(s)
- Andrea Owe, Seth D. Baum, Mark Coeckelbergh
- Abstract
To be intrinsically valuable means to be valuable for its own sake. Moral philosophy is often ethically anthropocentric, meaning that it locates intrinsic value within humans. This paper rejects ethical anthropocentrism and asks, in what ways might nonhumans be intrinsically valuable? The paper answers this question with a wide-ranging survey of theories of nonhuman intrinsic value. The survey includes both moral subjects and moral objects, and both natural and artificial nonhumans. Literatures from environmental ethics, philosophy of technology, philosophy of art, moral psychology, and related fields are reviewed, and gaps in these literatures are identified. Although the gaps are significant and much work remains to be done, the survey nonetheless demonstrates that those who reject ethical anthropocentrism have considerable resources available to develop their moral views. Given the many very high-stakes issues involving both natural and artificial nonhumans, and the sensitivity of these issues to how nonhumans are intrinsically valued, this is a vital project to pursue.
- Organisation(s)
- Department of Philosophy
- External organisation(s)
- Global Catastrophic Risk Institute
- Journal
- Science and Engineering Ethics
- Volume
- 28
- No. of pages
- 29
- ISSN
- 1471-5546
- Publication date
- 08-2022
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 603122 Philosophy of technology
- Keywords
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Health(social science), Health Policy, Management of Technology and Innovation, Issues, ethics and legal aspects
- Portal url
- https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/nonhuman-value(46b89033-665e-457a-8092-c9dede6056c0).html