Nonhuman Value

Author(s)

Andrea Owe, Seth D. Baum, Mark Coeckelbergh

Abstract

To be intrinsically valuable means to be valuable for its own sake. Moral philosophy is often ethically anthropocentric, meaning that it locates intrinsic value within humans. This paper rejects ethical anthropocentrism and asks, in what ways might nonhumans be intrinsically valuable? The paper answers this question with a wide-ranging survey of theories of nonhuman intrinsic value. The survey includes both moral subjects and moral objects, and both natural and artificial nonhumans. Literatures from environmental ethics, philosophy of technology, philosophy of art, moral psychology, and related fields are reviewed, and gaps in these literatures are identified. Although the gaps are significant and much work remains to be done, the survey nonetheless demonstrates that those who reject ethical anthropocentrism have considerable resources available to develop their moral views. Given the many very high-stakes issues involving both natural and artificial nonhumans, and the sensitivity of these issues to how nonhumans are intrinsically valued, this is a vital project to pursue.

Organisation(s)

Department of Philosophy

External organisation(s)

Global Catastrophic Risk Institute

Journal

Science and Engineering Ethics

Volume

28

No. of pages

29

ISSN

1471-5546

Publication date

08-2022

Peer reviewed

Yes

Austrian Fields of Science 2012

603122 Philosophy of technology

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Health(social science), Health Policy, Management of Technology and Innovation, Issues, ethics and legal aspects

Portal url

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/46b89033-665e-457a-8092-c9dede6056c0