How to do robots with words

Author(s)

Mark Coeckelbergh

Abstract

Moral status arguments are typically formulated as descriptive statements that tell us something about the world. But philosophy of language teaches us that language can also be used performatively: we do things with words and use words to try to get others to do things. Does and should this theory extend to what we say about moral status, and what does it mean? Drawing on Austin, Searle, and Butler and further developing relational views of moral status, this article explores what it means to conceptualize moral status in a performative way and in a way that reaches deep down to its basis, proposes a distinction between strong and weak versions of this view, and discusses the implications for thinking about the moral status of humans and nonhumans. Next to contributing to theory about performativity in the moral domain in general, this effort helps to reveal, understand, and evaluate the performative dimension of utterances made in public discussions about the moral status of animals and artificial agents such as robots and artificial intelligence.

Organisation(s)

Department of Philosophy

Journal

Ethics and Information Technology

Volume

25

ISSN

1388-1957

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-023-09719-5

Publication date

09-2023

Peer reviewed

Yes

Austrian Fields of Science 2012

603122 Philosophy of technology

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Library and Information Sciences, Computer Science Applications

Portal url

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/8bc220dd-918f-40d3-91d4-80c8b8bbb5ac