Publications

How to do robots with words

Author(s)
Mark Coeckelbergh
Abstract

Moral status arguments are typically formulated as descriptive statements that tell us something about the world. But philosophy of language teaches us that language can also be used performatively: we do things with words and use words to try to get others to do things. Does and should this theory extend to what we say about moral status, and what does it mean? Drawing on Austin, Searle, and Butler and further developing relational views of moral status, this article explores what it means to conceptualize moral status in a performative way and in a way that reaches deep down to its basis, proposes a distinction between strong and weak versions of this view, and discusses the implications for thinking about the moral status of humans and nonhumans. Next to contributing to theory about performativity in the moral domain in general, this effort helps to reveal, understand, and evaluate the performative dimension of utterances made in public discussions about the moral status of animals and artificial agents such as robots and artificial intelligence.

Organisation(s)
Department of Philosophy
Journal
Ethics and Information Technology
Volume
25
ISSN
1388-1957
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-023-09719-5
Publication date
09-2023
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
603122 Philosophy of technology
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Library and Information Sciences, Computer Science Applications
Portal url
https://ucris.univie.ac.at/portal/en/publications/how-to-do-robots-with-words(8bc220dd-918f-40d3-91d4-80c8b8bbb5ac).html