Why dignity is a troubling concept for AI ethics

Author(s)

Jon Rueda, Txetxu Ausín, Mark Coeckelbergh, Juan Ignacio del Valle, Francisco Lara, Belén Liedo, Joan Llorca Albareda, Heidi Mertes, Robert Ranisch, Vera Lúcia Raposo, Bernd C. Stahl, Murilo Vilaça, Íñigo de Miguel

Abstract

The concept of dignity is proliferating in ethical, legal, and policy discussions of AI, yet dignity is an elusive concept with multiple philosophical interpretations. The authors argue that the unspecific and uncritical employment of the notion of dignity can be counterproductive for AI ethics.

Organisation(s)

Department of Philosophy

External organisation(s)

CSIC - Real Jardin Botanico (RJB), Spanish National Research Council, Universidad de Granada, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Ghent University , Universität Potsdam, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, University of Nottingham, Oswaldo Cruz Institute, Ikerbasque Basque Foundation for Science, University of the Basque Country

Journal

Patterns

Volume

6

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2025.101207

Publication date

03-2025

Peer reviewed

Yes

Austrian Fields of Science 2012

603122 Philosophy of technology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Decision Sciences

Portal url

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/aef620b5-6b9f-4dee-924a-7e43f545fa0c